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**INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE  
CENTRAL AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY COMMUNITY: AN  
ANALYSIS OF THE THRESHOLD EFFECTS**

**LIMI KOUOTOU HIBRAHIM<sup>1</sup>; NGUIDJOL MA'A JOSEPH STÉPHANE<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> **Corresponding author**, PhD in economics, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Economics and Management, The University of Yaounde II - Soa, PO BOX: 18 Yaounde - Cameroon.

<sup>2</sup> PhD, Faculty of Economics and Management, The University of Yaounde II – Soa, Cameroon.

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**Abstract**

This paper examines the effects of governance, as measured by various institutional indicators, on the economic growth of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) countries between 1996 and 2016. Each indicator chosen, namely the weight of regulation, the rule of law, the participation of citizens, political stability, government efficiency and the absence of corruption, has made it possible to test the existence of a minimum threshold from which the quality of governance favors the growth of economies. The threshold detection method used is that of Hansen, based on data from the World Bank. The results show that among the six indicators assessed, four admit minima, above which the quality of institutions makes governance an asset for growth. The two institutional variables that derogate from the rule are political stability and the absence of corruption. The main conclusion is that in the CEMAC zone, governance by the quality of institutions requires the achievement of minimum numerical targets, that is optimal thresholds for the weight of regulation, the rule of law, citizen participation and government effectiveness; the sustainability of economic growth depends on it.

**Key Words:** governance, institution, economic growth, threshold panel.

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